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Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional
Economics
by
Victor P. Goldberg

One significant division that emerged during the conference involved t
of risk aversion in analyzing institutional arrangements. I, along with O
Williamson, took the position that the risk aversion assumption deflects
tion from the more significant determinants and that more progress wo
made if we could bind our hands and agree to invoke attitudes toward ris
as a last resort.1 Professor Richter has graciously given me this opportun
elaborate upon this theme.
Risk aversion is a conversation-stopper. I mean this in two senses. Fir

people with mono-causal world views, one explanation is enough. It

fanciful, I think, to identify a standard research strategy. When confr
some stylized institutional fact (e.g., hedging in futures markets, comm

pricing, sharecropping, indexation of prices) invoke risk aversion.2

appears consistent with the facts, stop the search. This strategy is not a
sary consequence of the assumption of risk aversion, but the pattern se
from an informal reading of the evidence, to be a strong one. Deprived
risk-aversion short cut, the analyst would be forced to pursue other, an
believe richer, lines of thought. Which leads to my second point: model
entails opportunity costs. If risk aversion is to be included, then we ha
simplify the world in other ways in order to build tractable models or ot
make some sense of a complicated reality. If we assume that people are
or less risk neutral, then we can focus on the sorts of questions that I th
important in understanding economic institutions. If we insist on includi
preferences in the model, then these other considerations must be put
A common retort to the no-risk-aversion position is: But don't you b
that people really are risk averse?3 The ad hominem variant on this the

1 See Williamson [1985, 388-389], Klein [1983, 370] and Barzel [1982] have

a similar position.
2 See Wiliamson's [1985, 389] discussion of Townsend's [1982] analysis of mul
od contracts. In Townsend's model there would be no multi-period contracts

differential risk aversion.

3 I suspect that much of the intuitive appeal of risk aversion to non-economists
(notably law professors) derives from a misconception about its definition. Risk aversion
for them means that people are averse to downside risk.
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Well, do you buy insurance? There are a number of responses to these
ments. The first, and probably least important, is that the evidence f
cognitive psychologists suggests that risk aversion does not adequately d
behavior.4 But that observation is largely beside the point. Even if eve
were risk averse it might still be appropriate to assume risk neutrality.
any headway in theorizing we must simplify reality and assume thing
to be false.

I am bewildered by economists who make the "people really are risk averse"
argument and at the same time make wildly unrealistic assumptions about the
ability of individuals to make complex calculations and engage in long chains
of sophisticated reasoning. The evidence on risk aversion is at least mixed. The
evidence regarding people's reasoning skills we see every day and it is pretty
clear that most people can't handle tenthgrade word problems, let alone some
of the sophisticated mental feats routinely assigned to them by economic theorists. My point is not that the unrealistic assumptions negate the conclusions.
It is simply that the assumption regarding risk preferences should, like the
assumptions regarding computational skills, be judged for their usefulness, not
for their realism.

The question about the purchase of insurance, alluded to above, had an
implied premise : people buy insurance because (and only because) they are risk

averse. This is a good example of how the risk-aversion assumption stifles
inquiry. There are numerous reasons why parties might buy insurance even if
they are not risk averse. An interesting array of problems and solutions awaits
the analyst willing to go beyond the limits imposed by a risk-aversion based
research strategy.5
Why might a large corporation with publicly traded shares buy various lines
of casualty insurance? One might try to attack the problem by assuming that
managers are risk averse and that the behavior of the firm in this dimension
reflects the manager's preferences. I doubt that this line of argument will work.
It implies that corporations which self-insure for the same problems act as if
they are not risk averse. I suspect that it would require some elaborate intellectual contortions to develop a plausible argument as to why some corporations
act as if they are risk averse and others risk neutral.6

4 See the papers reproduced in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky [1982].

5 Another obvious area in which it is easy to stop at risk aversion as the explanation
is the nature and function of futures markets. For examples of thoughtful analysts who

have found risk aversion unhelpful in understanding futures markets, see Working
[1962], Telser [1981], and Williams [1986].
6 A more natural framework for analyzing self-insurance is given below. The risk
aversion argument can be salvaged by arguing that the firm would want to purchase
insurance but for the usual panoply of insurance problems - adverse selection, moral
hazard, erroneous classifications, etc. That is, the firm would buy actuarially fair insurance, but not the insurance actually offered to it.
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It seems to me far more helpful to supp
risk and focus on why a risk neutral cor

the most interesting reason is that th

provider of risk management services.7
Smith [1982]). The insurance company pr
tion) to reduce the firm's expected accide
tion and rehabilitation of victims). Since
inspector has performed the promised se
contract would make compensation cont
efficient inspection contract might incl
ings - standard features of insurance co
would be difficult to reconcile liability

tion.) The share of the premium dolla

considerably over different lines of insu
tant, with over twenty percent of the p
(steam boiler and elevator insurance, for
The existence of self-insurance can be tr
lem is viewed in this light. Instead of fo
organizations, the focus is on whether a
ment activities internally, or whether it
from an external provider. This is a stan
would confront the corporation regardle

neutral, risk loving, or had some even m
risk.

What is the effect of insurance on a corporation's accident costs? A risk-aversion framework suggests that costs will remain the same (the risks are exogenous) or increase (moral hazard results in less accident avoidance by the corporations). My framework suggests that insurance could easily result in a decrease
in accident costs if the external provider of risk management services is a more
efficient provider than the self-insuring corporation. Thus, if public policy
resulted in an increase in the costs of commercial insurance relative to self-in-

surance, my framework would suggest that it is plausible that accident costs
would rise - a result that could not be derived from the risk-aversion approach.
Let me suggest another puzzle regarding insurance. When one buys a house
(at least in the United States) one typically buys title insurance and property
insurance. This seems consistent with risk aversion since the house is typically
a very large element in the buyer's portfolio. The puzzle involves the fact that

the lender usually conditions the loan upon the buyer's purchase of the insurance. This seems peculiar if risk aversion is the driving force. Is the bank
7 Interestingly, shortly after the conference while touring the London Museum, I
happened upon an exhibit concerning the development of fire insurance following the
great fire of 1 666. The insurers all had their own fire companies and, in effect, provided
protection services to their customers, bearing the costs when the protection failed.

8 See Goldberg [1980, 72-73].
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more risk averse than the buyer? That can't be right. Is the bank just doi

buyer a favor, reminding him of something he would have done anywa
he bothered to think about it? I doubt that many economists would fin
comfort pursuing that line of explanation. If we ask instead why a risk-n
bank would require title and property insurance, then we can get some in
The title insurance question is relatively easy. The probability of an "acc
(faulty title) depends upon the level of care in conducting the title sear

bank, in effect, hires a specialist to research the title. The search co

provides that, in the event that the searcher erred, it will compensate th

for losses arising from the error. My impression is that only a very

percentage of the premium for title insurance is paid out to those with a
title. The vast bulk of the revenues cover the provision of the loss-redu
service.

I am somewhat less confident about the bank's interest in property insu

but I can suggest a plausible line of inquiry. The bank is exposed to

hazard on the part of the borrower. The bank bears the bulk of the losse
the destruction of an uninsured borrower's house and has no effective control

over what the user does with the house. Moreover, it would be extremely
difficult for the bank to set (and readjust) a price for bearing the exposure to
these losses over time. An independent firm, the insurance company, that has
a mechanism in place for pricing the exposure and has some tools for inducing
the home owner/borrower to take greater care (for example, a reduced premium if the owner installs smoke alarms) can, plausibly, perform this task more
efficiently than can the lender. I don't claim that this is a fully satisfactory
resolution of the problem.9 My point is a more modest one. The existence of
the problem itself is obscured when we observe the world through risk-aversion
tinted glasses.
One of the issues that stimulated the discussion of risk aversion at the

conference was Professor Varian's [1989] analysis of tax farming. He analyzed
the problem in terms of a risk-averse government hiring a risk-neutral tax
farmer to collect taxes from risk-averse taxpayers. I argued that tax farming
was just a special case of a more general problem: the collection of debts. The
creditor (whether it is a private firm or the government) has to decide whether
particular debts should be collected by employees or by specialist outsiders.
Further, it has to decide whether the collector should be compensated with
wages, a sharing rule, a fixed fee, or some other compensation scheme. Professor Varian demonstrated that a particular configuration of risk preferences
would result in a specific outcome in which the collector paid a fixed fee to the
creditor (the state) for the privilege of collecting the debt (taxes). My primary
9 Friedman [1973, § 9.7] notes that mortgages for commercial landlords often include
covenants requiring that the landlord maintain fire insurance and that similar terms are
often included in its leases. He suggests that this is "to assure the tenant that the landlord
will have funds to pay for restoration."
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complaint was that the invocation of attitud
interest. Why, for example, would a firm s
counts receivable and not others? Is it risk averse over some of its business

activities, but not others? Is that even a coherent question? Once again, it
strikes me as much more instructive to suppress risk attitudes and to focus
instead on the other determinants of whether the collection should be vertically
integrated and the manner in which the collectors are compensated.
Following the conference Professor Varian and I had an illuminating discussion of a specific problem. Large automobile manufacturers like General Motors commonly enter into supply contracts with parts suppliers in which the
supplier bears all the risks of demand fluctuations. Some non-economists argue
that this is an instance of a large firm using its power to shift costs to a smaller
firm. There are two problems with this argument. First, if the large firm does
indeed have power vis à vis the smaller firm, there is no a priori reason that the
power should be exercised in this dimension. It could, for example, simply force

the supplier to sell at a lower price. Thus, to complete the argument it is
necessary to show that exercising the power in this particular way results in

greater profits than had it been exercised otherwise. Second, if all that is
involved is the shifting of an exogenous risk, why would rational parties choose
to shift the risk from a large firm to a small firm? If firms are characterized by
risk attitudes, it would seem extraordinarily odd to find that huge General
Motors is more risk averse than its much smaller suppliers. It makes no sense
for General Motors to pay someone to bear the risks when it could do so at a
lower cost. A theory driven by risk aversion should predict that General Motors
would bear the losses.

Why then does the contract shift the risks from General Motors to its
suppliers? It is easiest to attack this problem by first assuming a risk-neutral
automobile manufacturer, vertically integrated into supplying a particular part.
It faces an inventory problem. How much capacity for part production should
it maintain to meet the expected demand? Determination of the optimal inventory is a fairly routine business decision for the integrated firm. Its decision
depends on the relative costs of error and the loss function is asymmetric. Other
things equal, the inventory should be greater the greater the costs of having an
inadequate stock on hand and the lower the costs of maintaining an inventory
that was too large. Since the entire production line might have to be shut down
if there is a shortfall of a particular part, the costs of the inventory being too
low can be considerable.

If the part is to be provided by an independent firm, the parties face the same
inventory problem and they face the additional problem of coordinating their

decisions across organizational boundaries. A plausible way to achieve this
coordination would be for General Motors to compensate (directly or indirectly) the supplier for holding a large inventory of parts or productive capacity
while keeping the quantity decision in General Motors' hands. That, in effect,
is what the supply contracts provide for.
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Professor VariarTs response to this argument was to accept it and to a
that General Motor's vulnerability to having an inadequate inventory of

could be characterized as General Motors being more risk averse th

supplier in this context. Risk aversion, in this interpretation, is not a ma
attitude toward risk. It is a description of the curvature of a utility functi
mathematics does not depend on the label and, since risk aversion gives
a particular functional form, the convention seems to be that whenever
functional form is observed or assumed we simply label it as characteriz
risk-averse individual or organization. In a letter following the conferen
Professor Varian made essentially that point: "risk aversion can... be tho
of as a reduced form of a more detailed model."10

It might well be, therefore, that our quarrel is merely semantic. I suspe
With this interpretation, all the intuitive appeals to risk aversion vanish.
is no reason to believe that the relevant functions are linked in any way
the underlying preferences toward risk. People who really are risk aver

act as if they are risk neutral in some contexts and risk loving in o

Underlying risk preferences can be overwhelmed by context.
And that is my point. The focus ought to be on the context - the sort

problems featured in the new institutional economics. The underlyin

preferences should simply be ignored so that we may highlight what I
to be the more significant determinants of institutional structure. This c
sion is not a logical inevitability. It reflects the experience of those of u
there in the trenches who have found risk preferences generally unhelpfu
efforts.

The initial motivation for this conference was to bring together two groups
studying economic institutions in quite different ways - the formal theorists on
the one hand and a looser group of informal theorists and empiricists on the

other. I recognize that the formal theorist's research agenda is driven in large
part by an internal aesthetic that need have little contact with the "real world."
Nonetheless, I do believe that explaining the stylized facts is a significant piece
of that agenda. It certainly was at the core of Professor Varian's conference
paper. My hope is that our efforts can provide the theorist with a better set of
stylized facts and a strategy for coping with them (one piece of which is the
notion that risk attitudes should be invoked only as a last resort). I don't know
whether the altered research agenda envisioned can meet the aesthetic standards of the current one. I hope it can, because we can use all the help we can
get.

10 In the context of his tax farming example, he noted that "the rulers may have a very
high preference for cash in certain states of nature in order to pay their army, or to satisfy

other sorts of contractual obligations." (Personal letter dated June 7, 1989.)
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